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By the early 1960s, many influential judges and commentators had concluded 
that implied assumption-of-risk tort doctrines had lost their vitality, as the 
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components of assumption of risk that were worth preserving could be subsumed 
by other areas of negligence law.1  These scholars argued that such a 
reconfiguration could, and should, occur.2  In the ensuing decades, court decisions 
followed the path paved by these pioneers by endorsing the abandonment of 
implied assumption of risk as a stand-alone doctrine.3  These opinions 
persuasively and logically concluded that assumption of risk has no useful place 
in American tort law.4   
Despite this strong support, some appellate judges (and, presumably, the 
lawyers arguing before them) refuse to abandon the assumption-of-risk doctrine; 
instead, they confirm the continuing relevance of Associate Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s 1943 observation: 
The phrase “assumption of risk” is an excellent illustration of the extent 
to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law.  A phrase begins life 
as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and 
repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly 
used to express different and sometimes contrary ideas. . . . Plainly 
enough only mischief could result . . . .5  
This Article discusses the mischief caused by the chronic, uncritical use of the 
phrase “assumption of risk.” Part I provides background and context, featuring 
reminders of the best analyses of assumption of risk.  Part II explains the types of 
mischief that imprecise analysis spawns, such as poorly reasoned cases that leave 
unhelpful precedent in their wake.  Part III uses pleading rules and the doctrine of 
informed consent to suggest another way of viewing assumption of risk in the 
                                                 
 1. See Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. 1967) (abandoning the doctrine of 
assumption of risk and adopting a “reasonableness of conduct” standard for determining negligence 
cases); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 95–96 (N.J. 1959) (defining 
assumption of risk as a “phase of contributory negligence”); Hartman v. Brigantine, 129 A.2d 876, 
880 (N.J. 1957) (concluding that because “assumption of risk . . . adds little to contributory 
negligence . . . it [should be] subsumed under [that] defense”); Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of 
Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 168–69 (1952) (declaring that the concept of assumption of risk “should be 
abolished”); John W. Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. 
REV. 5, 14 (1961) (advocating the eradication of the doctrine of assumption of risk). 
 2. See Parker, 421 S.W.2d at 592 (explaining that the distinctions between “assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence are not significant enough to warrant retaining assumption of risk as a 
separate doctrine”); Meistrich, 155 A.2d at 96 (noting that doctrines of primary and secondary 
assumption of risk lead to confusion); James, supra note 1, at 169 (finding that assumption of risk 
“adds nothing to modern law except confusion” and is based on outdated policy). 
 3. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 701 (Cal. 1992) (concluding that the doctrine of 
assumption of risk should merge with the doctrine of contributory negligence); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 
532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (holding assumption of risk as “abolished to the extent that it is 
merely a variant of . . . contributory negligence”); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla. 
1977) (finding no distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence); Perez v. 
McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902, 905–06 (Tenn. 1994) (abandoning the doctrine of assumption of 
risk and focusing on the “reasonableness of a party’s conduct”). 
 4. See supra note 3. 
 5. Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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hope that judges and laywers will better understand and use the assumption-of-
risk doctrine.  Although this Article refers to cases involving express assumption 
of risk, in which the parties’ allocations of risks are stated specifically or reduced 
to writing,6 this Article principally focuses on cases involving implied assumption 
of risk, in which the parties’ allocations of risk are implicit in their conduct.7 
I.  THE TRUTH ABOUT ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
A.  Characteristics of the Paradigm Negligence Case and Their Implications 
To establish a prima facie case for negligence, a plaintiff bears the burdens of 
pleading, production, and persuasion for each element of negligence: duty, breach 
of duty, cause in fact, proximate cause, and damages.8  On the other hand, a 
defendant bears the burden of establishing an affirmative defense, such as 
contributory negligence.9  For many years, proof of a plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence constituted a complete defense to a negligence claim.10  Between a 
negligent defendant and a negligent plaintiff, common law favored the 
defendant.11  The common law also favored the defendant in cases in which the 
plaintiff “assumed the risk” that caused an injury.12 
In negligence cases decided before the adoption of comparative fault, courts 
applied two distinguishable assumption-of-risk analyses: primary implied 
assumption of risk and secondary implied assumption of risk.  A court applying 
the primary implied assumption-of-risk analysis found that a given plaintiff’s 
prima facie case failed to establish the element of duty or breach of duty.13  For 
example, in a lawsuit brought by a letter carrier who fell on the defendant’s “wet, 
slushy . . . full of chicken dirt” premises,14 the Supreme Court of Missouri found 
                                                 
 6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (2000) (noting that express assumption of risk 
is also referred to as a contractual limitation on liability). 
 7. Id. cmt. i (describing implied assumption of risk as “when a plaintiff’s conduct demonstrates 
merely that the plaintiff was aware of the risk and voluntarily confronted it”). 
 8. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 269 (2000); David G. Owen, The Five Elements of 
Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2007). 
 9. JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING 
TORTS 258 n.1 (2d ed. 2000) (“[D]efendants must affirmatively prove a defense and persuasively 
establish its application to the facts only after a plaintiff has established a prima facie case . . . .”); 
DOBBS, supra note 8, at 493 (“[T]he defendant has the burden of producing evidence about defenses 
like contributory fault and likewise the burden of persuading the trier of fact about what the evidence 
shows.” (footnote omitted)). 
 10. DIAMOND, LEVINE & MADDEN, supra note 9, at 258; DOBBS, supra note 8, at 494 (noting 
that contributory negligence “was a complete bar to the claim” (footnote omitted)). 
 11. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 494 (explaining that under the old rule, a plaintiff who was only 
slightly negligent was completely barred from any recovery, even if the defendant was grossly 
negligent). 
 12. DIAMOND, LEVINE & MADDEN, supra note 9, at 258; DOBBS, supra note 8, at 535. 
 13. See, e.g., Paubel v. Hitz, 96 S.W.2d 369, 373–74 (Mo. 1936). 
 14. Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:175 
that the risk of “passage over the runway was voluntarily incurred . . . [and 
therefore the] defendant breached no legal obligation owed [to the] plaintiff.”15   
A court applying the analysis of secondary implied assumption of risk explored 
the nature and quality of the injured party’s conduct to determine if it was 
culpable.16  For example, in a lawsuit brought against a hotel by a guest injured 
on an unstable walkway, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
observed that one who knowingly uses a dangerous path could be “barred from a 
recovery by contributory negligence, or by voluntary assumption of the risk.”17   
Although both of these analyses precluded a finding of liability during the era 
in which the doctrines of assumption of risk developed, today—an era in which 
comparative principles reign18—the two forms of assumption of risk must be 
distinguished, as each can yield different results.19  Under the comparative 
approach to negligence, injured parties whose culpable conduct contributed to 
their injuries are no longer completely barred from obtaining damages from 
negligent defendants.20  Instead, the damages awarded to them are reduced to 
account for their own contributions to their injuries.21  
                                                 
 15. Id. at 374. 
 16. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 1997) (describing assumption of risk as “culpable 
conduct attributable” to the injured party).  In pre-comparative-fault parlance, courts used language 
like “knowing,” “voluntary,” and “unreasonable,” rather than “culpable,” to define an injured party’s 
conduct.  See, e.g., Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 193 S.E. 57, 58 (W. Va. 1937) (noting an individual 
who knows that a passageway is dangerous may be barred from payment).  Furthermore, secondary 
assumption of risk comprised two subcategories: “strict” (or “pure”) secondary implied assumption of 
risk and “qualified” (or “unreasonable”) secondary implied assumption of risk.  Blackburn v. Dorta, 
348 So. 2d 287, 290–91 (Fla. 1977).  Although these two subcategories encompassed distinct 
behaviors, the characteristic essential to both was the injured party’s voluntary encounter with a 
known risk.  Id. at 291. 
     In modern times, some still believe an injured party’s knowing and voluntary conduct, regardless 
of its reasonableness, should be a “complete affirmative defense to a claim of negligence.”  See John 
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, 
Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence 
Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 349, 349 (2006). 
 17. Hunn, 193 S.E. at 58. 
 18. DIAMOND, LEVINE & MADDEN, supra note 9, at 263 (“In all but four states, contributory 
negligence has been replaced by some form of comparative negligence.”). 
 19. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 700 (Cal. 1992) (“With the adoption of comparative 
fault, . . . it became essential to differentiate between the distinct categories of cases that traditionally 
had been lumped together under the rubric of assumption of risk.”); see also infra Part II.B–C. 
 20. Knight, 834 P.2d at 700. 
 21. Id.; see DOBBS, supra note 8, at 503–06 (explaining that if a defendant is twenty-five 
percent culpable, then his or her damages will be reduced by twenty-five percent).  The New York 
statute illustrates “pure” comparative fault: 
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, 
the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the decedent, including contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages 
otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct 
attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the 
damages. 
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Given the latter twentieth-century evolution of comparative fault, the following 
summary states the sensible, supportable, and analytically sound conclusions 
concerning implied assumption of risk: (1) primary implied assumption of risk 
addresses the validity of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, specifically the elements 
of duty or breach;22 and (2) secondary implied assumption of risk addresses the 
quality of the injured party’s conduct, specifically its reasonableness or lack 
thereof.23 
These conclusions, however, continue to elude significant numbers of judges 
and lawyers.24  Thus, the bedevilment and mischievous consequences of which 
Justice Frankfurter wrote continue despite the curative efforts of some judges and 
commentators who have thoroughly explained why implied-assumption-of-risk 
concepts can be subsumed by existing elements of negligence or by the 
affirmative defense of contributory negligence.25  Ironically, persistent users of 
assumption-of-risk terminology often fail to either use the terminology properly 
or provide principled rationales in support of their deviations.26  Indeed, many 
judicial opinions suggest that rather significant confusion exists with respect to 
the substantive differences among the various components of implied assumption 
of risk.27  In the past, this benign analytical confusion produced harmless 
                                                                                                                 
 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411. 
 22. Perez v. McKonkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1904) (“Clearly, primary implied 
assumption of risk is but another way of stating the conclusion that a plaintiff has failed to establish a 
prima facie case by failing to establish that a duty exists.”); see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 
703–04 (Cal. 1992) (“[I]n primary assumption of risk cases—where the defendant owes no duty to 
protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm—a plaintiff who has suffered such harm is not 
entitled to recover from the defendant, whether the plaintiff’s conduct in undertaking the activity was 
reasonable or unreasonable.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Blackburn v. 
Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977) (“The term primary assumption of risk is simply another 
means of stating that the defendant was not negligent, either because he owed no duty to the plaintiff 
in the first instance, or because he did not breach the duty owed.”); Meistrich v. Casino Arena 
Attractions, 155 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J. 1959) (explaining that primary assumption of risk is not a distinct 
concept of negligence); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967–68 (N.Y. 1986) (explaining that the 
primary assumption-of-risk doctrine relieves the defendant of a duty of care to the plaintiff). 
 23. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 704 (“[I]n secondary assumption of risk cases—involving 
instances in which the defendant has breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff—the defendant is 
not entitled to be entirely relieved of liability for an injury proximately caused by such a breach, 
simply because the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering the risk of such an injury was reasonable 
rather than unreasonable.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Blackburn, 348 
So. 2d at 291 (describing implied secondary assumption of risk in terms of the plaintiff’s 
reasonableness); see also James, supra note 1, at 195 (explaining that “[a] plaintiff’s unreasonable 
assumption of risk would constitute contributory negligence on his part” (emphasis in original)). 
 24. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 98–108. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
180 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:175 
error.28  In the modern era of comparative negligence,29 however, the same 
confusion produces both immediate and long-term harmful error.30  
B.  Bedeviling the Law 
Implied assumption of risk has a long history in American tort law.31  
Traditionally, negligence law manifested an all-or-nothing philosophy by finding 
a definitive winner and loser in each negligence case.32  Under this approach, a 
defendant who made a persuasive argument rooted in assumption of risk became 
the winner.33  Thus, whether the plaintiff’s assumption of risk was of the primary 
or the secondary type made no difference to the outcome of a lawsuit;34 a plaintiff 
who “assumed the risk” in any sense simply lost the case.35 
Accordingly, under this traditional approach, imprecision could safely be 
tolerated, as courts could apply the same assumption-of-risk language to explain 
the outcomes of factually different cases.  One such factual distinction is the 
preexisting plaintiff-defendant relationship.  Parties who had a relationship—such 
as an employee-employer relationship—before the injury-causing event occurred 
had the opportunity to shape some actual, even if implicit, understanding about 
their respective responsibilities.36  By contrast, other cases involved parties who 
were complete strangers, and therefore did not have such an opportunity.37   
                                                 
 28. See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 29. This Article uses the terms “comparative responsibility,” “comparative fault,” and 
“comparative negligence” interchangeably. 
 30. See, e.g., Fagan v. Atnalta, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 204, 205–06 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming 
summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff’s assumption of risk when he intervened 
in a bar fight “without being asked”). 
 31. See Eric A. Feldman & Alison Stein, Assuming the Risk: Tort Law, Policy, and Politics on 
the Slippery Slopes, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 267 (2010) (noting that the assumption-of-risk doctrine 
was first introduced to U.S. courts in 1859). 
 32. See DOBBS, supra note 8, at 494 (explaining the traditional rule that a plaintiff was barred 
from relief if he or she committed any degree of negligence). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 700 (Cal. 1992) (“[T]here often was no need [before the 
comparative-negligence approach] to distinguish between the different categories of assumption of 
risk cases, because if a case fell into either category, the plaintiff’s recovery was totally barred.”). 
 35. See DOBBS, supra note 8, at 494. 
 36. See, e.g., Lamson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585, 585 (Mass. 1900) (denying the 
plaintiff-employee relief for his injuries because he continued to work despite his knowledge of the 
dangerous condition and the defendant-employer’s failure to fix it); Farwell v. Bos. & Worcester  
R.R. Corp., 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 49, 57 (1842) (“The general rule, resulting from considerations as well 
of justice as of policy, is, that he who engages in the employment of another for the performance of 
specified duties and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and 
perils incident to the performance of such services . . . .”). 
 37. See, e.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) (denying 
recovery to a plaintiff who was injured while on an amusement-park ride); Gulfway Gen. Hosp. v. 
Pursley, 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965) (denying the plaintiff relief after she slipped and fell on 
ice outside a hospital’s emergency-room entrance).  
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Also likely responsible for the indiscriminate use of assumption-of-risk 
terminology was the irrelevance of a primary or secondary label to the outcome of 
a case.   During its early development, case law exhibited at least three discrete 
sets of circumstances that fell under the umbrella of assumption of risk: (1) 
negligence by neither the defendant nor the plaintiff; (2) negligence by both the 
defendant and the plaintiff; and (3) negligence by either the defendant or the 
plaintiff.  Judges could appropriately use the assumption-of-risk label to 
characterize a case involving any of these fault configurations despite their 
underlying differences.  
In modern times, however, the luxury of early nineteenth- and twentieth-
century imprecision is no longer affordable.  In this era of comparative fault, it is 
critical that courts distinguish between the failure of a plaintiff’s prima facie case 
(primary implied assumption of risk), resulting in a defendant’s victory, and a 
successful affirmative defense based on the plaintiff’s culpable conduct 
(secondary implied assumption of risk), resulting in a reduction of the damages 
imposed on the defendant.38  
In this modern comparative-fault era, some commentators favor including an 
additional variant39 that would treat an injured party’s knowing and voluntary 
conduct as a “complete affirmative defense to a claim of negligence.”40  Such a 
“genuine” assumption of risk would be akin to the concept of consent.41  
Proponents of this variant argue that the concept is appropriate for cases in which 
a defendant proves “that a particular plaintiff did in fact knowingly and 
voluntarily undertake to confront a specific, identifiable risk (or set of risks) that 
stands out from background risks, and that was later realized in the form of an 
injury to the plaintiff.”42  The reasonableness (or lack thereof) of the injured 
party’s behavior in confronting the “specific, identifiable risk” would be 
irrelevant.43 
Pursuing the creation of another variant of implied assumption of risk is fraught 
with difficulties.  On a basic level, the language of implied assumption of risk is 
already distorted by qualifiers and reservations that fail to distinguish among its 
current categories.44  Another and more fundamental difficulty lies in the 
                                                 
 38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 39. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 348–50. 
 40. Id. at 349. 
 41. Id. at 344, 349. 
 42. Id. at 344.  But see Gregory S. Sergienko, Assumption of Risk as a Defense to Negligence, 
34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2006) (noting that “some requirement that goes beyond merely knowing 
and voluntary conduct is necessary, or the doctrines of assumption of risk will bar recovery to those 
who are aware of the hazard-creating conduct of others . . . .”). 
 43. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 344. 
 44. See Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (describing the “different and sometimes contradictory ideas” that the phrase “assumption 
of risk” has been “undiscriminatingly used to express”); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 
(Fla. 1977) (describing the doctrine of assumption of risk as a “potpourri of labels, concepts, 
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inconsistency between the defense of a “genuine” assumption of risk, as described 
by its proponents, and other aspects of modern negligence law.45  Such a defense 
would restore the vitality of the “patent danger rule,” which exonerates the creator 
of a dangerous condition so long as the danger is sufficiently obvious to give 
warning.46  The exoneration is effective even if the danger can be eliminated or 
reduced without significantly burdening the defendant.47   
In addition, the defense of a genuine assumption of risk would defy the “danger 
invites rescue” doctrine by preventing an injured rescuer’s recovery of damages 
from a party who negligently placed another in a position of peril.48  Recognizing 
this defense as a complete bar to recovery would revive the concept that a 
reasonably acting injured party could not recover damages from a negligent 
defendant simply because his or her reasonable conduct was knowing and 
voluntary.49  Finally, although some courts have recognized the defense of a 
genuine assumption of risk, they have not defined its scope or explained its 
rationale; instead, the courts seem to rely on an “I know it when I see it” approach 
in their reasoning.50 
                                                                                                                 
 
definitions, thoughts, and doctrines”); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 
1959) (“Assumption of risk is a term of several meanings.”). 
 45. For a discussion of modern negligence cases see infra Part II.B–C. 
 46. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 10.2, at 623–24 (2005) (discussing the 
rise of the patent-danger rule, with particular emphasis on Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 
1950), overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576–77 (N.Y. 1976), and the subsequent 
fall of the rule in cases other than those involving alleged failures to warn).  In Campo, the New York 
Court of Appeals dismissed a case against a machine manufacturer based on the plaintiff’s failure to 
prove a latent defect in a machine that “so badly injured [his hands] that they required amputation.”  
Id. § 10.2, at 623; see also Campo, 95 N.E.2d at 804.  The Court of Appeals of New York later 
adopted a more liberal approach to the patent-danger rule taken in other jurisdictions and stated 
“Campo suffers from its rigidity in precluding recovery whenever it is demonstrated that the defect 
was patent.  Its unwavering view produces harsh results . . . . Apace with advanced technology, a 
relaxation of the Campo stringency is advisable.”  Micallef, 348 N.E.2d at 576–77. 
 47. See OWEN, supra note 46, § 10.2, at 623. 
 48. See Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437–38 (N.Y. 1921) (noting that a defendant is 
liable to an injured child as well as “the parent who plunges to its aid”).  But see Eckert v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 506–08 (N.Y. 1871) (Allen, J., dissenting) (arguing that a man injured 
while acting gratuitously to rescue a child must “take the consequences of his act”). 
 49. Blackburn v. Dorta provides a compelling hypothetical example of knowing and voluntary 
conduct that could be either reasonable or unreasonable.  In this example, a man arrives at his 
apartment building to discover that his landlord’s negligent actions had set the building on fire.  348 
So. 2d at 291.  Aware of the risk involved, the man rushes into the burning building to retrieve his 
child.  Id.  The man acts knowingly and voluntarily, but also reasonably given the objective of his 
risky behavior.  Id.  Had the object of his rescue been his favorite fedora, however, his conduct would 
have been not only knowing and voluntary, but also “clearly . . . unreasonable.”  Id.  The application 
of the genuine assumption of risk defense treats both situations the same, resulting in an unattractive 
lack of uniformity in tort law.  Id. 
 50. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declining to 
define obscenity, but asserting “I know it when I see it”). 
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Therefore, as articulated in sound judicial opinions51 and in the well-reasoned 
analyses of influential commentators,52 primary implied assumption of risk relates 
to the adequacy of a plaintiff’s prima facie case, specifically the duty and breach 
elements;53 secondary implied assumption of risk deals with the reasonableness of 
an injured party’s conduct.54  Accordingly, primary assumption of risk survives as 
a complete defense to liability despite the adoption of comparative fault.55 This 
survival does not depend on some special or mysterious status, however.  Rather, 
primary assumption of risk is a complete defense because it precludes a finding of 
any liability, just as a plaintiff’s failure to establish causation precludes a finding 
of liability in virtually all negligence cases.56  By contrast, secondary assumption 
of risk’s essential equivalence to contributory negligence has caused it to lose its 
status as a complete defense to liability in the era of comparative fault.57  
The unfortunate instinct that the term “assumption of risk” engenders is to leap 
immediately to a judgment about the injured party’s thoughts or conduct without 
first considering whether the defendant breached a duty of care or acted 
reasonably.  A more orderly analysis, which is essential for achieving consistent 
results when comparative fault applies, distinguishes between a fatal flaw in the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case and an affirmative defense based on the injured party’s 
culpable conduct.  The discussions in post-comparative-fault cases, however, 
have revealed the unfortunate fact that some courts persist in using the 
                                                 
 51. See supra notes 1, 3. 
 52. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 8, at 539 (“The reasons for barring the plaintiff entirely can 
now be divorced from the old law and terminology of assumed risk and can be stated as cases of no 
duty or no negligence.  The cases themselves, however, remain.”); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES 
OF TORT LAW 212 (3d ed. 2010) (“Under the approach advocated here, the first question the court 
should ask is whether the defendant fell below the standard of care the law prescribes for the activity 
at issue.  Only if the answer to that question is yes, for if the defendant was not negligent the action 
will proceed no further, the court will ask whether the plaintiff fell below the standard prescribed for 
the plaintiff’s activity.  Ordinarily, if she did not, she will win outright.  If she did, then her action will 
be barred or her recovery will be reduced under comparative negligence.” (footnote omitted)); James, 
supra note 1, at 185–88 (“The [implied assumption of risk] doctrine . . . is simply a confusing way of 
stating certain no-duty rules or, where there has been a breach of duty toward the plaintiff, simply one 
kind of contributory negligence.”). 
 53. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 54. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 55. Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986); see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 
703 (Cal. 1992) (acknowledging that the primary assumption of risk doctrine “continues to operate as 
a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery”); DOBBS, supra note 8, at 539. 
 56. See DOBBS, supra note 8, at 539.  The exceptions involve judicial reallocation or 
modification of the cause-in-fact burden in special situations.  See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 
P.2d 924, 936–37 (Cal. 1980) (holding all of the defendant-drug manufacturers liable for the 
plaintiff’s injuries under a market-share liability analysis, despite the plaintiff’s inability to identify 
exactly which manufacturer produced the injury-causing drug); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 
1948) (shifting the burden of proof to the co-defendants when both were negligent, but only one 
caused the injury, and the plaintiff was unable to indentify which of the two was responsible). 
 57. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 704–05; Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tenn. 1994). 
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terminology of assumption of risk imprecisely.58  This practice creates the 
potential for the “mischief” that Justice Frankfurter so aptly predicted.59   
II.  THE MISCHIEF: OVERINCLUSIVENESS, MISTREATMENT, AND LACK OF 
CLARITY 
Imprecise analyses of assumption of risk in judicial opinions cause at least 
three kinds of mischief: (1) overly inclusive definitions of primary implied 
assumption of risk, which result in the misapplication of that doctrine; (2) 
treatment of primary implied assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, rather 
than a failure of the prima facie case; and (3) conclusory references to an 
unspecified “assumption of risk” as significant or even decisive.  Moreover, 
careless language pervades these opinions, revealing either ignorance of or 
indifference to the analytical nuances particularly important in cases that set 
precedent for trial courts.60 
A.  The Most Significant Mischief: An Overly Inclusive Definition and 
Consequent Misapplication of Primary Implied Assumption of Risk 
1.  Primary Implied Assumption of Risk Defined and Distinguished 
Primary assumption of risk is appropriately invoked when an activity’s inherent 
risk manifests itself.61  For example, a football player who was tackled and 
injured experienced a risk inherent in playing football.  A figure skater who fell 
and broke her leg while performing a challenging maneuver experienced a risk 
inherent in ice skating.62  Such risks are neither created nor exacerbated by 
negligence; they simply exist.  As a result, neither the football player nor the 
skater would be able to establish a prima facie case of negligence.  Their 
situations are classic examples of primary implied assumption of risk and mirror 
the plaintiffs’ experiences in the paradigm pre-comparative-fault cases, Murphy v. 
                                                 
 58. See Sy v. Kopet, 795 N.Y.S.2d 75, 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 
202, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 59. Tiller v. Atl. Coastline R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 60. See, e.g., Pelzer v. Transel Elevator & Elec., Inc., 839 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007) (“Extensive and unrestricted application of the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk to 
tort cases generally represents a throwback to the former doctrine of contributory negligence, wherein 
a plaintiff’s own negligence barred recovery from the defendant.”); Sy, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 76 (stating 
that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precludes plaintiff’s recovery when the evidence 
exhibited the plaintiff’s negligence while climbing through a window, not the absence of a duty to the 
plaintiff). 
 61. See DOBBS, supra note 8, at 540 (discussing a defendant’s lack of duty when a plaintiff 
consents to risky activities). 
 62. Numerous other activities, such as skiing, horseback riding, and walking in a busy street, 
carry inherent risks.  For a recent and comprehensive discussion of the plethora of cases brought by 
injured skiers, see Feldman & Stein, supra note 31, at 271–77. 
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Steeplechase Amusement Co.,63 Paubel v. Hitz,64 and Gulfway General Hospital 
v. Pursley.65  
a.  Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.: The Risk of “The Flopper” 
James Murphy fractured his kneecap on a Coney Island attraction called “The 
Flopper,” a name that bespoke the challenge it presented to riders.66  The Flopper 
apparently had been functioning normally, with its riders “tumbling about the belt 
to the merriment of onlookers.”67  The mechanism had been “transmitt[ing] 
smoothly,” with no evidence of electric surges or interruptions.68  Based on these 
facts, then-Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo explained that the operator of the ride 
did not breach the duty of care owed to Murphy.69  The court’s lack of reliance 
on, or indeed any reference to, the reasonableness of Murphy’s conduct indicates 
a reliance on primary, rather than secondary, assumption of risk.70  As the 
flopping that Murphy experienced was the very point of the ride, Murphy’s 
decision to participate would have been unreasonable only if all riders’ decisions 
were unreasonable.71  Moreover, the defendant would have been subject to 
liability only if the attraction was so dangerous that merely making it available to 
patrons was unreasonable.72 
b.  Paubel v. Hitz: The Risk of a Feces-Laden Walkway 
Edward Paubel, a letter carrier, slipped and fell on chicken manure while 
delivering mail to a patron on his route.73  The court found that the sufficiently 
                                                 
 63. 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929). 
 64. 96 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1936). 
 65. 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App. 1965). 
 66. Murphy, 166 N.E. at 173–74. 
 67. Id. at 174. 
 68. Id.  The court found evidence 
that power was transmitted smoothly, and could not be transmitted otherwise.  If the 
movement was spasmodic, it was an unexplained and, it seems, an inexplicable departure 
from the normal workings of the mechanism.  An aberration so extraordinary, if it is to lay 
the basis for a verdict, should rest on something firmer than a mere descriptive epithet, a 
summary of the sensations of a tense and crowded moment. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 173–75.  Before Murphy, New York courts allowed recovery for those who 
knowingly, voluntarily, and reasonably exposed themselves to the risks created by another’s 
negligence.  See, e.g., Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437–38 (N.Y. 1921) (granting a new 
trial to determine if the injured plaintiff acted with “reason fitted and proportioned to the time and the 
event”); Eckert v. The Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 505–06 (1871). 
 71. Murphy, 166 N.E. at 174. 
 72. See id. (“A different case would be here if the dangers inherent . . . were obscure.”).  For a 
more critical view of Judge Cardozo’s opinion, see generally Kenneth W. Simons, Murphy v. 
Steeplechase Amusement Co.: While the Timorous Stay at Home, the Adventurous Ride the Flopper, 
in TORTS STORIES 179 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 73. Paubel v. Hitz, 96 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Mo. 1936). 
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apparent chicken manure on the walkway “was not only obviously but actually 
known and appreciated by the plaintiff.”74  Accordingly, Paubel could not 
establish the element of breach.75  Paubel’s testimony did not provide a basis for 
the defense of secondary implied assumption of risk because he spoke in detail 
about the care he took while walking down the pathway.76  That statement about 
walking carefully also displayed his subjective awareness of the risk presented by 
walking on the chicken manure.77  
c.  Gulfway General Hospital v. Pursley: The Risk of an Icy Walkway 
Similarly, after Mrs. Pursley noticed that ice had accumulated on the 
defendant-hospital’s emergency entrance walkway, she nonetheless began to walk 
along it and fell.78  Here again, the court found that the danger gave warning of 
itself, preventing Mrs. Pursley from establishing a prima facie case of negligence 
against the hospital.79  Like James Murphy and Edward Paubel, Mrs. Pursley did 
not act unreasonably; she merely tried to obtain medical treatment for her severed 
fingertip.80 
2.  The Distortion of Primary Implied Assumption of Risk: Misapplication of 
the English Language 
Regrettable misstatements about primary assumption of risk appear in cases 
with precedential value, in which they distort negligence law and create the 
potential for irrational decisions.81   
The origins of these problematic statements are ambiguous, and only a few are 
readily identifiable.  For example, although purporting to apply precedent from 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 373–74. 
 75. Id. at 374. 
 76. Id. at 370–73. 
 77. Id. at 370.  Paubel explained that he had been “wearing a pair of Dr. Sawyer’s high shoes, 
practically new, with rubber heels.”  Id. 
 78. Gulfway Gen. Hosp. v. Pursley, 397 S.W.2d 93, 93 (Tex. App. 1965).  Pursley testified that 
“the porch was open, and it was light there, where you could see the ice.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 79. Id. at 93–94. 
 80. Id. at 93. 
 81. See, e.g., Trupia v. Lake George Cent. Sch. Dist., 875 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009), aff’d, 927 N.E.2d 547 (N.Y. 2010) (“‘Extensive and unrestricted application of the doctrine of 
primary assumption of the risk to tort cases generally represents a throwback to the former doctrine of 
contributory negligence, wherein a plaintiff’s own negligence barred recovery from the defendant.’” 
(quoting Pelzer v. Transel Elevator & Electric, Inc., 839 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007))); 
Cotty v. Town of Southampton, 880 N.Y.S.2d 656, 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (expressing concern 
about absolving from liability those who “negligently creat[e] risks that might be considered inherent 
in such leisure activities”); see also Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 582 (Cal. 2007) (“[C]areless conduct 
by coparticipants is an inherent risk in many sports, and . . . holding participants liable for resulting 
injuries would discourage vigorous competition.” (emphasis added)); Kelly v. McCarrick, 841 A.2d 
869, 877–78, 881, 886 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (using the terms “negligent,” “inherent,” and 
“incidental” interchangeably while discussing risks assumed). 
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the Ohio Supreme Court, Ohio’s intermediate appellate courts have applied the 
so-called principle that negligence is a risk inherent in certain recreational 
activities.82  This proposition is rife with problems, with the most patent being its 
misuse of the terms “inherent” and “recreational.”   
The term “inherent” refers to a characteristic that is an innate, permanent, or 
essential attribute.83  Parachute jumping, for example, carries a number of 
inherent risks.  Each jumper is exposed to the possibility of an ill-placed landing, 
which could cause an injury.  On the other hand, each jumper is not exposed to 
the risk of injury resulting from a carelessly packed parachute.  Contrasted with a 
faulty landing, this risk is neither a permanent nor an essential attribute of the 
activity; rather, the carelessly packed parachute enhances the risks beyond those 
inherent in the activity.84   
Moreover, judicial reliance on the proposition that inherent risks exist in certain 
recreational activities produces overbroad and poorly justified applications, such 
as the failure to distinguish clearly between participants and spectators.  In 
addition, the term “recreational” is permitted to encompass an exceedingly broad 
range of activities.  To illustrate, the Ohio Supreme Court considered  
chair-building to be within the scope of a recreational activity.85  Questioning the 
majority’s definition of “recreational,” the dissenting judge asked, “What’s  
next . . . mowing the lawn, draining the septic tank, or digging a ditch?”86 
B.  Characterizing Primary Assumption of Risk as an Affirmative Defense 
It is axiomatic that when a plaintiff cannot establish an element of the prima 
facie case, he or she loses.  The plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal without 
regard to the merits of any affirmative defenses, such as contributory negligence.  
Because a court’s finding of primary implied assumption of risk means that the 
                                                 
 82. See Curtis v. Schmid, 2008-Ohio-5239, ¶54, No. 07 CAE 11 0065, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 
4391, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2008) (“[S]ome risks [including the risk of negligence] are so 
inherent in an activity that the risks cannot be eliminated.”); Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines, 172 
Ohio App. 3d 226, 236–37, 2007-Ohio-1800, ¶¶ 28–36, 874 N.E.2d 811, 819–20 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007) (questioning whether the plaintiff assumed an inherent risk of injury when jumping on a 
trampoline). 
     The Ohio Supreme Court’s odd use of assumption of risk terminology engenders additional 
confusion.  In Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., the court (1) treated the term “implied 
assumption of risk” as referring only to secondary implied assumption of risk, an affirmative defense 
that the defendant must plead and prove; (2) stated that “primary assumption of risk is technically not 
an affirmative defense, as it directly attacks the duty element of a prima facie negligence case;” and 
(3) found that the defendants waived the “defense” of primary assumption of risk by not raising it in a 
timely manner and presenting evidence to support it. 659 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 n.3, 1239 (Ohio 1996). 
 83. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS: AMERICAN EDITION 767 (1996). 
 84. In varying ways, other state courts have committed the same analytical error.  See supra 
note 82. 
 85. Gentry v. Craycraft, 101 Ohio St. 3d 141, 142–43, 2004-Ohio-379, ¶ 6, 802 N.E.2d 1116, 
1118 (Ohio 2004) (precluding liability because the defendants’ conduct was neither intentional nor 
reckless). 
 86. Id. at 1120 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
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plaintiff failed to establish his or her prima facie case, the labeling of primary 
implied assumption of risk as an affirmative defense unduly complicates case 
analysis, creating both substantive and procedural confusion.  For example, in a 
relatively recent case, the New York Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ 
request to amend their answer to assert the “affirmative defense” of primary 
assumption of risk.87  In their original answer to the complaint, however, the 
defendants denied the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence, thereby raising the 
issue of primary assumption of risk,88 which should have obviated the need to 
amend the complaint.89  But the New York courts failed to point out that the issue 
had indeed been raised in a timely manner and instead gave credence to the idea 
that primary implied assumption is an affirmative defense.90 
Courts’ treatment of primary assumption of risk as an affirmative defense might 
be justifiable if they were to acknowledge that such a treatment changes the rules 
by requiring defendants to disprove an element of the prima facie case.  Instead, 
courts perpetuate the fiction of the “[j]udicially created affirmative defense 
whereby a defendant owes no duty,”91 a clearly confused explanation, as a finding 
of “no duty” constitutes a failed prima facie case of negligence.   
Additionally, some courts provide overbroad generalizations of primary 
assumption of risk even though narrower comments would be more fitting.  For 
example, in a relatively recent opinion, one court stated that “[t]he doctrine of 
primary [implied] assumption of risk relieved the defendants of any duty of care 
that they may have owed the plaintiff.”92  This is an exemplary instance of an 
                                                 
 87. Trupia v. Lake George Cent. Sch. Dis. 927 N.E.2d 547, 548 (N.Y. 2010); see also McGrath 
v. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 906 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (characterizing a 
primary-implied-assumption-of-risk argument as an affirmative defense). 
 88. See generally Answer, Trupia, 927 N.E.2d 547 (No. 42646/02) (denying allegations of 
negligence and asserting affirmative defenses, including assumption of risk). 
 89. See generally Amended Answer, Trupia, 927 N.E.2d 547 (No. 42646/02). 
 90. See Trupia, 927 N.E.2d at 548. In addition, the court commingled primary and secondary 
assumption of risk, and used the unmodifed term “assumption of risk” without qualification.  Id. at 
548–50. 
 91. Hague v. Summit Acres Skilled Nursing & Rehab., 2010-Ohio-6404, ¶ 36, No. 09 NO 364, 
2010 WL 5545386, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2010).  Armstrong v. Washington is another 
example, in which an inmate filed a negligence suit against the Washington Department of 
Corrections for supplying her with sports shoes that were too large, which caused her to fall and 
injure herself.  No. 62506-3-I, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 2414, at *1–2 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 
2009).  The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court 
affirmed on the basis of “implied primary assumption of risk” by the plaintiff.  Id. at *3, *9.  The 
court treated primary assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, yet described it as “‘really a 
principle of no duty, or no negligence, and so denies the existence of the underlying action.’” Id. at *9 
(emphasis added) (quoting Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc’y, 875 P.2d 621, 633 (Wash. 
1994)).  Moreover, the court appeared to rely as much on the inmate’s lack of regard for her own 
safety as it did on an absence of negligence by the defendant.  See id. at *6, *8 (discussing the 
inmate’s awareness of the risk and her decision to “continue exercising in the oversized shoes 
anyway”). 
 92. Sy v. Kopet, 795 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
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overinclusive, inaccurate statement of the law, and it is particularly obvious, as 
the parties maintained a landlord-tenant relationship.93   
C.  The Failure to Distinguish Between the Categories of Assumption of Risk 
In addition to the foregoing potential confusion created by mischaracterizing 
primary assumption of risk, other negative consequences stem from imprecise and 
inaccurate labels.  Under the comparative, rather than all-or-nothing, approach in 
modern negligence law,94 only secondary implied assumption of risk, 
unreasonable conduct by the injured party, is an affirmative defense to the 
defendant’s unreasonable conduct.95  On the other hand, primary implied 
assumption of risk remains a complete defense to a negligence action and results 
in a defendant’s successful denial of any liability.96  
Accordingly, even though a court may reach a defensible result, it may do so by 
using sloppy diction in stating that a plaintiff “assumed the risk” of injury.97  For 
example, in Davis v. Kellenberg Memorial High School, the court found that the 
plaintiff “assumed the risk inherent of injury in horseplay” when a concrete bench 
toppled and fell on his foot.98  The “horseplay” involved several students, who 
stood on the bench and shifted their weight to make it rock.99  The bench indeed 
rocked, and it landed on the foot of one rocker.100  A more responsible and 
orderly analysis would have inquired whether a breach occurred, and then most 
likely would have found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie 
case.  
In Davis, the sloppy analysis was harmless because the defendant was not held 
liable.101  Not all cases, however, are decided rightly when analyzed incorrectly.  
                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1992). 
 96. See DIAMOND, LEVINE, & MADDEN, supra note 9, at 226 n.1; DOBBS, supra note 8, at 494. 
 97. McGrath v. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 906 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 
(failing to distinguish between primary and secondary assumption of risk and treating a defense that 
could only have been the former as an “affirmative defense”). 
 98. 725 N.Y.S.2d 588, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
 99. Id. at 588. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  Similarly, the trial judge in Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, instructed the jury that 
an open and obvious danger gives notice of itself, thereby discharging the defendant-landowner’s 
duty to an invitee.  930 A.2d 881, 884 (Del. 2007).  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, 
explained its affirmance on the basis of a “secondary assumption of risk” by the plaintiff and failed to 
address whether the defendant was negligent in the first place.  Id. at 885–86.  This inconsistency is 
also evidenced in Koutoufaris v. Dilk, in which the court goes back and forth between a correct and a 
confused understanding of the distinctions between primary and secondary assumption of risk.  604 
A.2d 390, 397–98 (Del. 1992).  The court first states that “primary assumption of risk involves the 
express consent to relieve the defendant of any obligation of care while secondary assumption 
consists of voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable risk which is out of proportion to the 
advantage gained,” and it later confuses the two doctrines by stating,  “Where the assumption of risk 
is of the primary type . . . a plaintiff’s conduct might well constitute a complete bar to recover[y] . . . 
190 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:175 
In Fagan v. Atnalta, Inc., the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed summary 
judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff’s “assumption of risk,” but gave 
no indication whether the defendant had been negligent or the plaintiff had been 
contributorily negligent.102  In Fagan, a bar patron aided bar employees as they 
attempted to fend off a belligerent customer, thereby preventing injury to the 
employees but becoming the substitute victim of the customer’s hostility.103  The 
court, however, neglected to answer the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant-
bar owner had been negligent, and instead immediately characterized the 
plaintiff’s conduct as an “assumption of risk.”104  If, in fact, the assumption of risk 
was primary, then the defendant did not negligently place anyone in a position of 
peril, and the danger-invites-rescue doctrine would not apply.105  If the defendant 
was negligent, however, the assumption of risk could only have been secondary, 
which requires an assessment of the plaintiff’s reasonableness.106  Thus, the 
court’s opinion was inadequate and poorly analyzed, and it likely reached the 
wrong result.   
Even in cases that use the appropriate terminology, the mistake the Fagan court 
demonstrated—bypassing an inquiry into the defendant’s negligence and quickly 
resorting to a discussion of the plaintiff’s conduct—produces a truncated analysis. 
 For example, in Lamandia-Cochi v. Tulloch, a thirteen-year-old plaintiff sought 
to recover damages for injuries sustained from sliding down a handrail adjacent to 
the defendant’s porch steps.107  In its analysis, the appellate court bypassed any 
discussion of the defendant’s negligence by merely concluding that the plaintiff 
assumed the risk that “the handrail might bend or shift beneath him.”108  Does this 
conclusion signify that the defendant was not negligent toward the plaintiff, or 
that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety?   A better-
reasoned analysis would have acknowledged the absence of any need to discuss 
the plaintiff’s conduct after finding that the defendant did not owe or breach a 
duty to the plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                 
 
even in a comparative negligence jurisdiction.” Id. at 398 (emphasis added).  By focusing both 
primary and secondary assumption of risk inquiries on the injured party’s conduct, the court wrongly 
fused two distinct concepts. 
 102. See 376 S.E.2d 204, 205–06 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). 
 103. Id. at 204–05. 
 104. Id. at 205. 
 105. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 107. 759 N.Y.S.2d 411, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
 108. Id. (citations omitted); see also Armstrong v. Washington, No. 62506-3-I, 2009 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2414, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2009) (treating primary implied assumption of risk as an 
affirmative defense). 
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III.  ELIMINATING THE MISCHIEF: USING THE PLEADINGS AND THE LAW OF 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Two lines of reasoning may ameliorate the mischief.  One uses the pleadings to 
emphasize the two distinct defensive arguments, and the other parallels the 
analysis in an informed-consent case.  These analyses complement each other and 
allow one to form a clear picture of implied assumption of risk. 
A.  From the Perspective of the Pleadings 
In an answer to a complaint, the defendant must respond to each of the 
plaintiff’s allegations and plead any affirmative defenses.109  Therefore, the 
defendant’s answer may deny that any negligence occurred by stating that no duty 
existed or that a duty was not breached.  Such a denial gives notice of a 
forthcoming argument of primary implied assumption of risk.  In another part of 
the answer, the defendant can plead contributory negligence as an affirmative 
defense.110  This “BUT” defense is independent of the defendant’s position on the 
plaintiff’s allegations of negligence.111  It may be coupled with an admission of 
negligence (“Yes, but . . . .”), a denial of negligence (“No, but . . . .”), or an 
uncertain response (“Maybe, but . . . .”).  The defendant’s position on the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence is, in the parlance of assumption of risk, an 
argument of secondary implied assumption of risk.  
Denying negligence and pleading contributory negligence are independent 
actions.  If a defendant admitted negligence allegations, for example, he or she 
could still plead the affirmative defense of the injured party’s culpable conduct.  
Additionally, a defendant who denies a plaintiff’s allegations of negligence 
should, if appropriate, take the “belt-and-suspenders” approach—pleading any 
available affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence.112  Using the 
pleadings to compare discrete defensive arguments in the answer illustrates the 
distinctions between them and highlights the significance of their success or 
failure to the outcome of the lawsuit. 
1.  Primary Assumption of Risk: A Failure of the Prima Facie Case 
Commentators and influential state courts agree that a finding of primary 
implied assumption of risk is analytically equivalent to a finding that the 
defendant either did not owe or did not breach a duty of care to the plaintiff.113  
That is, a finding of primary implied assumption of risk means that the plaintiff 
failed to establish a prima facie case against the defendant.  Generally, the 
                                                 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 112. See United States v. Carona, 630 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The term ‘belt and 
suspenders’ is sometimes used to describe the common tendency of lawyers to use redundant terms to 
make sure that every possibility is covered.”). 
 113. See supra notes 1–3, 52. 
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defendant challenges the plaintiff’s prima facie case at the pleading stage by 
denying the pertinent allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint.114   
Despite the obvious association between a substantive denial of liability and 
the procedural vehicle for providing notice of that denial, many intermediate 
appellate and state court judges frequently label and treat primary implied 
assumption of risk as an affirmative defense.115  Such mischaracterizations 
produce weak legal rulings that encourage defense attorneys and trial judges to 
focus on the injured party’s conduct prematurely, without first analyzing the bases 
for a finding that the defendant acted unreasonably.  
2.  Secondary Assumption of Risk: An Affirmative Defense 
The defendant must raise and bear the burden of proof on the issue whether an 
injured party’s conduct was culpable and caused his or her injury.116  
Accordingly, pleading the injured party’s culpable conduct is properly placed in 
the affirmative-defenses section of the defendant’s answer,117 rather than the 
portion that admits or denies the allegations.118  The distinction between, and 
coexistence of, this approach and a denial of the allegations is demonstrated in 
numerous cases, one of which is Micallef v. Miehle.119  In Micallef, the plaintiff 
sued a machine-manufacturing company for negligently causing him an on-the-
job injury while he was operating a high-speed, photo-offset printing press.120  
The plaintiff’s actions exposed him to the obvious danger that his hand could be 
drawn into the “nip point” of the machine, which had no safety guard to protect 
his hand.121  In its defense, the Miehle Company invoked the patent-danger rule: 
“the manufacturer of a machine . . . dangerous because of the way in which it 
functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely to make it free 
from latent defects and concealed dangers.”122  The New York Court of Appeals 
took the opportunity presented by this case to reassess the validity of the patent-
danger rule in negligence cases and decided to hold that a manufacturer’s 
obligation should be based on the reasonableness of the risk created, rather than 
                                                 
 114. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(h)(2).  The defendant should deny the allegations, rather than label the 
challenge as a counterclaim or affirmative defense, because the burdens of production and persuasion 
usually accompany the burden of pleading.  See id. at 8(a). 
 115. See, e.g., Hague v. Summit Acres Skilled Nursing & Rehab., No. 09 NO 364, 2010 WL 
5545386, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2010); Albritton v. Kiddie, Inc., 591 N.E.2d 781, 782 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1990) (naming assumption of risk as an affirmative defense). 
 116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); SHUBHA GOSH, ACING TORT LAW 123 (2009) (“In establishing the 
defense of contributory negligence, a defendant has to show that the plaintiff’s conduct was 
unreasonable and that the unreasonable conduct caused the injury.”). 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 118. Id. at 8(b). 
 119. 348 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976). 
 120. Id.  Plaintiff tried to remove a foreign object or a “hickie” from the press, which was causing 
imperfections in the printed pages.  Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 575 (quoting Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. 1950)). 
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its obviousness.123  This decision made evidence of feasible safety measures 
relevant to the defendant’s lack of care in designing the machine; previously, such 
evidence was irrelevant due to the reliance on the patent-danger doctrine.124   
Using this new test, the court noted the evidence of at least three safeguards 
that would have protected Micallef, none of which would have impaired the 
utility of the machine, and thus exhibited the defendant’s negligent design.125  
The court allowed the negligent-design claim to go forward, rendering the 
obviousness of the danger a mere factor to be considered when assessing an 
injured party’s culpable conduct.126  Based on this ruling, a defendant in the 
Miehle Company’s position can both deny liability on the basis of an absence of 
negligence, rather than on the presence of an obvious danger, and assert an 
affirmative defense based on the culpability of the operator’s conduct in exposing 
himself to an open and obvious danger.127 
B.  From the Perspective of Informed Consent 
A second approach views cases involving primary assumption of risk through 
the lens of informed-consent analysis.128  Informed consent to medical treatment 
is a primary assumption of risk.  That is, the patient who consents to a medical 
procedure after receiving legally adequate information accepts the possibility that 
risks inherent to the diagnostic or treatment procedure may materialize.129  The 
risks, then, are inherent in the activity when it is performed according to the 
professional standard of care and do not amount to malpractice or negligence by 
the healthcare provider.130   
During my career as a registered nurse, I cared for a patient whose case 
exemplifies the link between informed consent and primary assumption of risk.  
                                                 
 123. Id. at 577 (“[W]e hold that a manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his 
plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to 
the danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended . . . as well as 
an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.” (citations omitted)). 
 124. Id. at 576–77. 
 125. Id. at 574 (discussing the testimony of engineer Samuel Aidlin). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 578.  The comparative-fault statute, which became effective the year before the 
Micallef decision, provides that “culpable” conduct by the injured party calls for a reduction in the 
award of damages.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2011). 
 128. The term “consent” often finds its way into the discussion of assumption of risk through the 
old adage volenti non fit injuria, which means, “to a willing person it is not a wrong.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009).  This familiar refrain is used in various court opinions.  See, e.g., 
Paubel v. Hitz, 96 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Mo. 1936); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 
173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).  Courts and commentators use the term “voluntary,” which implies 
“consensual,” in defining and discussing assumption of risk.  See, e.g, DIAMOND, LEVINE & 
MADDEN, supra note 9, at 268. 
 129. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he standard measuring 
performance of that duty by physicians, as by others, is conduct which is reasonable under the 
circumstances.” (footnote omitted)). 
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The patient, to whom I will refer as “Susan,” was a young woman with congenital 
heart disease who underwent a surgical replacement of her aortic valve.  She 
consented to the surgery after being fully informed of its inherent risks, including 
brain damage and death.  The rest of her story is as follows. 
Susan’s valve-replacement surgery required her heart to be motionless while 
the surgeon removed and replaced her diseased valve.131  Accordingly, the 
surgeon connected her to a cardiopulmonary bypass machine that took over her 
heart and lung functions, allowing her heart to be stopped.132  Catheters in 
Susan’s veins drained blood from her body, which circulated through the bypass 
machine to be oxygenated; then, the bypass machine pumped the newly 
oxygenated blood back into Susan’s body through an aortic catheter placed just 
above the surgical site.133  At the time of Susan’s surgery, these procedures were 
routinely used during valve replacements.134 
After replacing Susan’s diseased valve, the surgeon made successful use of 
electrical stimulation to restart her heart.135  At that point, Susan no longer needed 
the bypass machine to support her circulation.  Her heart and lungs had 
satisfactorily resumed functioning, and the staff expected Susan to leave the 
operating room in good condition.  At this time, about one liter of Susan’s blood 
remained in the reservoir of the bypass machine.  Standards of care directed that a 
patient’s own blood should be reinfused before giving that patient a transfusion of 
a donor’s blood;136 therefore, the surgeon instructed the perfusionist operating the 
bypass machine to continue reinfusing Susan’s blood into her body.  The 
perfusionist complied, and ran the bypass machine to give Susan a transfusion of 
her own blood through the aortic catheter. 
Soon after, something or someone distracted the perfusionist, causing the 
perfusionist not to notice when the reservoir became empty and allowed a large 
air bubble to enter the perfusion catheter.137  The surgeon, concentrating on 
finishing the surgery, did not see the air bubble until a deadly portion had already 
passed into Susan’s aorta.  Noticing this, the surgeon clamped the catheter, but he 
was too late.  
Due to massive brain damage as a result of the air embolism, and, pursuant to 
neurological criteria, Susan was pronounced dead shortly after she was transferred 
to the intensive-care unit post-surgery.  
                                                 
 131. See H. Newland Oldham, Jr., Congenital Aortic Stenosis, in 1 TEXTBOOK OF SURGERY 
2261, 2268 (David C. Sabiston ed., 13th ed. 1986) (discussing surgical treatment for ventricular 
obstructions). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. James K. Kirklin & John W. Kirklin, Cardiopulmonary Bypass for Cardiac Surgery, in 
TEXTBOOK OF SURGERY, supra note 131, at 2455, 2467 (discussing the “rewarming” after a 
cardiopulmonary bypass). 
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 137. Modern technology should have greatly reduced the likelihood of this sort of accident. 
2011] The Chronic Problem of Assumption of Risk 195 
As noted, Susan consented to this surgery and understood that some people 
who undergo aortic-valve replacement sustain brain damage or die under even the 
best circumstances.138  Nonetheless, a but-for causal connection undoubtedly 
existed between the surgery and Susan’s death.  Would Susan’s consent preclude 
a finding of liability against the potentially responsible parties in this case, even 
though the results she suffered were among those expressly identified to her 
before she consented?  Clearly, the answer is “no,” as this set of circumstances 
falls outside the scope of Susan’s primary assumption of risk.  She consented to 
the surgery with knowledge of the risks inherent in a medical procedure 
performed according to the standard of care.  She did not, however, consent to 
suffer brain damage and death.  The injection of an air embolism into Susan’s 
circulation—caused by the staff’s inattention to the cardiopulmonary bypass 
machine—is simply not among the risks inherent in the activity. 
Under other circumstances, however, the same outcome might well have been 
encompassed by Susan’s primary assumption of risk.  Consider this variation in 
the facts: Susan’s brain damage and death resulted from a blood clot that entered 
her circulatory system after it broke away from her diseased aortic valve before 
the surgeon could remove and replace it.  Like the air bubble, the circulating 
blood clot would have been an embolism.  Unlike the air bubble, the blood clot 
would not have been created or dislodged because of negligence.  The outcome in 
this variation, then, represents the materialization of a risk inherent in the activity. 
In this variation, Susan’s “primary assumption of risk” would preclude evidence 
of a breach (or negligence), and thus she would fail to establish a prima facie 
case.  
C.  Using the Pleadings and the Law of Informed Consent 
Susan’s case and its variation illustrate the connection between the doctrines of 
informed consent and primary implied assumption of risk.  One must simply 
remember the basics: (1) a primary implied assumption of risk encompasses only 
the risks inherent in the particular activity, does not include risks created or 
exacerbated by negligence, and signifies a plaintiff’s failure to make out a prima 
facie case; (2) a plaintiff’s secondary implied assumption of risk signifies that she 
has failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety, which produced the 
injury in conjunction with the defendant’s negligence, and is considered only if 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case; and (3) separate analyses are required 
for (a) cases involving a defendant’s lack of negligence, and (b) cases in which 
both the defendant and the plaintiff were negligent, as a defendant should prevail 
in the former and should share costs with the plaintiff in the latter.  
In Paubel v. Hitz, the chicken-manure case previously discussed, Paubel lost 
his negligence suit because he could not establish the breach element of his prima 
                                                 
 138. Heart Valve Surgery, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/ 
002954.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
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facie case.139  Hitz’s argument of Paubel’s primary assumption of risk would be 
raised as a denial in the answer to Paubel’s negligence allegations.  If the 
presence of the chicken manure gave warning of itself, and if providing a warning 
of the dangerous condition would discharge the defendant’s obligation of 
reasonable care, then breach could not be established and, therefore, the prima 
facie case also could not be established.  If reasonable minds could differ 
regarding the behavior that the standard of reasonable care required of the 
defendant (such as making a more frequent effort to clean the runway, which 
would reduce the risk), however, then the plaintiff would have established a prima 
facie case.  Now, in the latter case, the defendant would be well advised to 
anticipate the possibility of the plaintiff establishing a prima facie case by 
pleading contributory negligence in the affirmative-defense portion of the answer. 
In Evans v. Johns Hopkins University, the court affirmed summary judgment 
for the defendant based on an unspecified form of assumption of risk.140  The 
plaintiff, Evans, undertook to produce monoacetone glucose in a laboratory at 
Johns Hopkins University, where he was a graduate student.141  To accomplish 
this task, Evans synthesized acetone, a volatile and flammable substance, and 
glucose.142  While Evans was working on this project, the ingredients exploded 
and burned Evans’s body.143  Evans sued Johns Hopkins and alleged that the 
university negligently failed to supply “the particular laboratory in which [he] 
was working with ‘any ordinary or reasonable safety measures or precautions or 
devices necessary and proper for the purpose of quenching, controlling and 
extinguishing chemical explosions and fires.’”144 
The court held that “the plaintiff is barred by the defense of assumption of 
risk,”145 and did not rule on any other substantive issues.146  If the case were to be 
analyzed using the model suggested here, however, the defendant would be  
well-advised to take the belt-and-suspenders approach.  First, the defendant would 
be advised to deny the allegations of negligence in the answer to the complaint.  
As in Paubel, the court in this case might find in favor of the defendant as a 
matter of law.  On the other hand, it is possible that the plaintiff could produce 
sufficient evidence of negligence to require the jury to decide: whether the 
defendant adhered to industry customs concerning laboratory safety, whether an 
applicable statute or regulation established a laboratory safety standard, and 
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whether a Hand-Formula147 analysis would suggest a conclusion about the 
burdens and benefits of greater investments in safety.  Appropriate research into 
these questions might unearth a basis for reasonable minds to differ on the issue 
of breach.   
Based on these possibilities, the University should include contributory 
negligence allegations in the affirmative defense portion of its answer.  Perhaps 
the plaintiff was or should have been aware of the volatility and flammability of 
acetone as well as the availability of other laboratories equipped with the fire-
quenching equipment that his laboratory lacked.  A jury could certainly conclude 
that reasonable care for his own safety required the plaintiff to act more 
cautiously, and therefore, he could be found contributorily negligent.  
D.  The Noncompliant Patient/Client: A Final “Textbook” Case 
In the healthcare industry, noncompliant patients are those who fail to heed the 
advice of medical professionals.  The term encompasses behavior ranging from 
refusing treatment due to a religious belief,148 to ordinary contributory 
negligence,149 to downright obnoxiousness.150   
In Shorter v. Drury, for example, Doreen Shorter underwent a dilation and 
curettage (D&C) procedure to evacuate her uterus after her fetus died naturally in 
utero.151  Before the D&C, Shorter informed her physician that her religious 
beliefs precluded her from consenting to the administration of blood or blood 
products.152  Profuse internal bleeding after the D&C prompted Shorter’s return to 
the operating room for exploratory surgery, which revealed that her physician had 
caused severe lacerations of her uterus.153  Surgical repair proved ineffective, 
however, and Shorter died due to loss of blood.154 
                                                 
 147. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the 
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 152. Shorter, 695 P.2d at 118–19. 
 153. Id. at 119. 
 154. Id. 
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In the subsequent wrongful-death lawsuit pursued by Shorter’s husband, the 
jury found that Dr. Drury’s negligence in lacerating Shorter’s uterus proximately 
caused her death.155  The jury assigned seventy-five percent of the fault, however, 
to Shorter’s refusal to accept transfusions and her consequent assumption of the 
risk that she could bleed to death.156  The trial judge entered a judgment on the 
jury verdict and awarded twenty-five percent of the total compensatory 
damages.157 
Affirming the judgment on appeal, the Washington Supreme Court discussed 
the competing arguments concerning Shorter’s assumption of risk.158  Although 
Shorter assumed the risk of bleeding to death, the court concluded that she did not 
assume the risk of the physician’s negligence.159  But the court’s distinctions on 
these points do not make sense.  Had there not been negligence, the profuse 
bleeding that caused Shorter’s death would not have occurred.  The ordinary 
bleeding that may have occurred as an inherent risk of the procedure did not cause 
this lethal loss of blood; rather, severe uterine lacerations, which are not among 
the procedure’s inherent risks, led to her death.  
As a matter of law, Shorter’s case and the aortic-valve replacement case 
discussed earlier are very similar.  By refusing blood transfusions, Shorter 
accepted the consequences of forgoing any transfusions necessitated by the 
manifestation of risks inherent in the D&C procedure.  She did not, however, 
accept the consequences of negligence in the performance of the D&C, including 
consequences that called for administering blood or blood products—such as the 
uterine lacerations.  Just as Susan’s consent to undergo an aortic-valve 
replacement after being informed of the risks inherent in that procedure did not 
constitute consent to experience brain damage or death, Shorter’s informed 
consent to undergo the D&C did not constitute consent to exsanguination caused 
by severe lacerations to her uterus. 
In affirming the “split the difference” judgment entered by the trial court, the 
Washington Supreme Court did not address these problematic issues.160  But if 
one analyzes Shorter according to the model suggested in this Article, one 
reaches a result that is more faithful to the court’s statements than the court’s own 
conclusion turned out to be.  If Shorter’s physician submitted an answer that 
denied the allegations of malpractice, the question of primary implied assumption 
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of risk would have become an issue for the jury to resolve by determining 
whether the physician’s actions constituted malpractice and caused Shorter’s 
death.  The court’s discussion does not make evident whether this occurred or if 
the answer pled the affirmative defense of Shorter’s contributory negligence 
(secondary implied assumption of risk). The court bypasses these points by 
relying on the express assumption it found embodied in Shorter’s written refusal 
to accept blood transfusions.161  At the same time, the court rejects the notion that 
Shorter’s refusal is tantamount to absolving her physician completely of 
responsibility for the consequences of his negligent conduct.162  Moreover, the 
court did not mention the possibility that Shorter’s physician committed a 
separate act of malpractice by failing to at least seek a judicial order overriding 
Shorter’s refusal when she was in extremis.163 
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In sum, whether Shorter’s assumption of risk was express or implied, it was a 
primary assumption of risk.  She accepted risks inherent in the performance of a 
D&C, which did not include malpractice.  Arguing that her physician might have 
been able to rescue her from the consequences of his malpractice by violating her 
religious beliefs—or seeking a court’s blessing to ignore her wishes—does not 
justify a result that, in essence, blames the victim rather than the malpractitioner.  
It is one thing to demand that a person who refuses treatment accept the 
consequences of the refusal.  It is quite another to essentially disregard the reason 
that the refused treatment was necessary in the first place. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The ability to make adroit, effective, and yet ingenuous use of language serves 
lawyers well.  Language corrupted by careless, ignorant, or otherwise imprecise 
usage harms legal reasoning and analysis.  Judges especially need to watch their 
language, for they not only control the present, but also influence the future.  The 
burden to say what they mean and to mean what they say may be onerous—but it 
is necessary.  Being attentive to doctrine and procedure should enable judges to 
eliminate the mischief that otherwise results from uncritical use of words.  At 
present, however, a significant component of modern case law on assumption of 
risk perpetuates the confusion and mischief that arise from inconsistent use of 
terms and imprecise analysis of facts and precedent. 
It is possible to create a new rule that precludes the recovery of damages from a 
negligent defendant because of conduct by the injured party that is knowing and 
voluntary—even if it is reasonable.   This rule may be desirable, but it must be 
called something other than assumption of risk.  In the meantime, judges who find 
it necessary to rely on assumption-of-risk concepts must better understand, more 
succinctly state, and consistently apply those principles.  The “I know it when I 
see it” approach to assumption-of-risk analysis does not serve the interests of 
litigants or the law. 
                                                                                                                 
 
it appointed an emergency guardian to abridge this right”); In re Dell, 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 655, 656 (Pa. 
Ct. Comm. Pleas 1975) (discussing a court order that authorized emergency transfusion to an 
unwilling patient).  When an action becomes customary among the members of a profession, it is 
incorporated into the standard of care for that profession, and courts generally defer to such 
professional customs to identify standards of reasonable care.  DIAMOND, LEVINE & MADDEN, supra 
note 9, at 104 (“Because of the specialized skill and training needed to be a doctor . . . courts defer to 
the expertise of the profession to determine the appropriate standard of care.” (footnote omitted)). 
